Metaphysics, sophistry, and illusion : toward a widespread non-factualism /
Metaphysics, Sophistry, and Illusion introduces a novel kind of non-factualist view, and argues that we should endorse views of this kind in connection with a wide class of metaphysical questions. It also explains how these non-factualist views fit into a general anti-metaphysical view called neo-po...
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| Hlavní autor: | |
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| Typ dokumentu: | Kniha |
| Jazyk: | Angličtina |
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Oxford :
Oxford University Press,
2021
|
| Vydání: | First edition published |
| Témata: | |
| On-line přístup: | Elektronická verze přístupná pouze pro studenty a pracovníky MU |
| Příbuzné jednotky: | Tištěná verze::
Metaphysics, sophistry, and illusion : toward a widespread non-factualism |
Obsah:
- Cover
- Metaphysics, Sophistry, and Illusion: Toward a Widespread Non-Factualism
- Copyright
- Dedication
- Table of Contents
- Acknowledgments
- 1: Introduction
- 1.1 A Synopsis of This Book
- 1.2 The Ways in Which My View Is and Isn't Anti-Metaphysical
- 1.2.1 Non-Factualism as an Anti-Metaphysical View (In at Least One Way):
- 1.2.2 Two Ways in Which My View Is Not Anti-Metaphysical:
- 1.3 What I Say Here Isn't Really True
- Part I: Non-Factualism
- 2: Against Trivialism and Mere-Verbalism (and Toward a Better Understanding of the Kind of Non-Factualism Argued for in This Book)
- 2.1 Opening Remarks
- 2.2 Two (or Three) Kinds of Anti-Metaphysicalism
- 2.2.1 The First Two Kinds of Anti-Metaphysicalism:
- 2.2.2 Merely Verbal Debates:
- 2.2.3 Mere-Verbalism about Metaphysical Questions:
- 2.2.4 Relations between Mere-Verbalism, Trivialism, and Non-Factualism:
- 2.3 Non-Mere-Verbalist Non-Factualism
- 2.4 Some General Remarks about Metaphysical Problems
- 2.5 Against Metametaphysical Verbalism
- 2.5.1 A Quick Version of the Argument Against Metametaphysical Verbalism about the Temporal Ontology Debate:
- 2.5.2 Responses to Objections:
- 2.5.3 Generalizing:
- 2.6 A Recipe for Finding Non-Verbal Debates
- 2.7 Against Actual-Literature Verbalism
- 2.8 Why Trivialism Without Metametaphysical Verbalism Is Metaphysically Uninteresting
- 2.9 Two Kinds of Non-Factualism
- 3: How to Be a Fictionalist about Numbers and Tables and Just about Anything Else
- 3.1 Opening Remarks
- 3.2 The Mathematics-Based Argument Against Non-Factualism
- 3.2.1 The Argument: Consider the following thesis:
- 3.2.2 Mathematical Error Theory and Mathematical Non-Factualism:
- 3.2.3 Two Arguments for the Truth of Mathematics:
- 3.3 A Theory of Objective Fictionalistic Mathematical Correctness
- 3.3.1 C-Fictionalism:.
- 3.3.2 Refining C-fictionalism (or FBC-fictionalism):
- 3.3.3 Proto-Mathematical Truths:
- 3.3.4 Relations to Other Views:
- 3.4 FBC-Fictionalism to the Rescue
- 3.4.1 Truth in the Story of Abstract Objects as a Legitimate Kind of Objective Correctness:
- 3.4.2 Usefulness, Harmlessness, Intuitiveness, and the Quine-Putnam Argument:
- 3.5 Do FBC-Fictionalists Unwittingly Commit to Abstract Objects?
- 3.6 Generalizing the Fictionalist Strategy (or Fictionalist Views of Other Kinds of Objects)
- 3.6.1 Other Kinds of Abstract Objects:
- 3.6.2 Composite Objects:
- 3.6.3 Generalizing:
- 3.7 The Response to the Objection to Non-Factualism
- 3.8 A Recipe for Responding to Section-2.4-Style Arguments
- 3.9 A Possible Slight Alteration to What I've Said Here
- 3.10 A Worry and a Response
- 4: Non-Factualism about Composite Objects (or Why There's No Fact of the Matter Whether Any Material Objects Exist)
- 4.1 Opening Remarks
- 4.2 Is the Composition Question Trivial?
- 4.3 Against Necessitarianism
- 4.3.1 The Non-Necessity of Genuine Existence Claims:
- 4.3.2 Against Necessitarian Tableism:
- 4.3.3 Against Necessitarian Anti-Tableism:
- 4.4 Against Contingentism
- 4.5 The Law of Excluded Middle
- 4.6 From Tables to Composite Objects
- 4.7 Pushing the Argument Further
- 4.8 Un-Weird-Ing the View (at Least a Little)
- 5: Non-Factualism about Abstract Objects
- 5.1 Opening Remarks
- 5.2 The Argument for Non-Factualism: Part 1
- 5.3 The Argument for Non-Factualism: Part 2
- 5.4 Against Necessitarian Platonism and Anti-Platonism
- 5.4.1 Against Necessitarian Platonism:
- 5.4.2 Against Necessitarian Anti-Platonism:
- 5.4.3 Summing Up:
- 5.5 Objections and Responses
- 5.5.1 The Whatever-It's-Like Objection:
- 5.5.2 Is the Problem Just with Our Conceptual/Imaginative Resources?:
- 5.5.3 Does My Argument Show Too Much?:.
- 5.5.4 Does My Argument Really Support Anti-Platonism?:
- 5.5.5 True Counterfactuals with Catastrophically Imprecise Antecedents:
- 6: Modal Nothingism
- 6.1 Opening Remarks
- 6.2 Modal Primitivism, Analyticity, and the Lingering Truthmaking Question
- 6.3 What Is Modal Nothingism?
- 6.3.1 Initial Statement of the Theory:
- 6.3.2 Fellow Travelers:
- 6.3.3 The Scope of Modal Nothingism:
- 6.3.4 Modal Nothingism, Bruteness, and Explanation:
- 6.3.5 Epistemology:
- 6.4 How Modal Nothingism Could Be True (and How TMW Could Be False)
- 6.5 The Literali's Argument for <
- Modal Nothingism>
- 6.6 The Argument for Modal Nothingism
- 6.7 The Possible-Worlds Analysis and Modal Error Theory
- 6.8 Modal Literalism and Semantic Neutrality
- 6.9 Logic
- 6.10 The Counterfactuals of Chapter 3 Revisited
- 6.11 Metaphysical Possibility and Necessity
- Part II: Neo-Positivism
- 7: What Is Neo-Positivism and How Could We Argue for It?
- 7.1 Opening Remarks
- 7.2 What Is Neo-Positivism?
- 7.3 Why Neo-Positivism Isn't Self-Refuting
- 7.4 How to Argue for Neo-Positivism: The General Plan
- 7.5 Step 1 of the Neo-Positivist Argument: How to Decompose a Metaphysical Question
- 7.5.1 Initial Remarks about Decomposition: Let me start with a definition:
- 7.5.2 Step 1A-The Stipulation Maneuver:
- 7.5.3 Step 1B-The Decomposition:
- 7.6 Step 2 of the Neo-Positivist Argument
- 7.6.1 Step 2A:
- 7.6.2 An Aside:
- 7.6.3 Step 2Bi-Weeding Out the Trivial Subquestions of the Which-Kinds-ofF-Like-Things-Are-There Question:
- 7.6.4 Step 2Bii-The Non-Trivial Subquestions of the Which-Kinds-of-F-LikeThings-Are-There Question:
- 7.7 Appendix on Scientism
- 8: Conceptual Analysis
- 8.1 Opening Remarks
- 8.2 What Is a Concept?
- 8.3 Three Metaphilosophical Views
- 8.4 Why the Decompositional View Is False.
- 8.5 A Quick Argument for the Relevance of Facts about the Folk
- 8.6 Pruning the List of Fact Types that Hybrid Theorists Might Think Are Relevant
- 8.6.1 Facts about Common Nature:
- 8.6.2 Facts about Relations to Other Concepts:
- 8.7 Why the Ordinary-Language View Is Correct
- 8.7.1 Facts about the Referents of Kind Terms:
- 8.7.2 Facts about Pragmatic Usefulness:
- 8.7.3 Facts about Coherence and Instantiation:
- 8.7.4 Facts about Lewis-Sider-Style Naturalness/Joint-Carvingness:
- 8.7.5 Running out of Ideas:
- 8.8 Scientism about Conceptual-Analysis Questions
- 8.9 Five Worries
- 8.9.1 The Objection from Analyticity:
- 8.9.2 Abstract Objects: Here's a second worry one might raise about my view:
- 8.9.3 The Negative Project of X-Phi:
- 8.9.4 Excessive Hating on Intuitions and Conceptual Analysis:
- 8.9.5 Definitions:
- 8.10 Why It Wouldn't Undermine Neo-Positivism if the Hybrid View Were Right
- 8.10.1 Facts about Coherence and Instantiation Revisited:
- 8.10.2 Facts about the Referents of Kind Terms Revisited:
- 8.10.3 Facts about Pragmatic Usefulness Revisited:
- 8.10.4 Facts about Lewis-Sider-Style Joint-Carvingness Revisited:
- 8.11 If Concepts Were Mental Objects . . .
- 9: Widespread Non-Factualism
- 9.1 Opening Remarks
- 9.2 Some Examples of Non-Factualism
- 9.2.1 Properties, Tropes, and Aristotelean Universals:
- 9.2.2 Material Constitution (i.e., the Statue-Lump Question):
- 9.2.3 Essence:
- 9.2.4 Moral Realism:
- 9.2.5 Grounding Facts and Lewis-Sider-Style Joint-Carving Facts:
- 9.2.6 Presentism vs. Eternalism:
- 9.3 Some Examples of Scientism
- 9.4 Neo-Positivist Humility
- 10: A Worldview
- References
- Index.