Metaphysics, sophistry, and illusion : toward a widespread non-factualism /
Metaphysics, Sophistry, and Illusion introduces a novel kind of non-factualist view, and argues that we should endorse views of this kind in connection with a wide class of metaphysical questions. It also explains how these non-factualist views fit into a general anti-metaphysical view called neo-po...
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| Typ dokumentu: | Kniha |
| Jazyk: | Angličtina |
| Vydáno: |
Oxford :
Oxford University Press,
2021
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| Vydání: | First edition published |
| Témata: | |
| On-line přístup: | Elektronická verze přístupná pouze pro studenty a pracovníky MU |
| Příbuzné jednotky: | Tištěná verze::
Metaphysics, sophistry, and illusion : toward a widespread non-factualism |
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| 100 | 1 | |a Balaguer, Mark, |d 1964- |7 mub2013783511 |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Metaphysics, sophistry, and illusion : |b toward a widespread non-factualism / |c Mark Balaguer |
| 250 | |a First edition published | ||
| 264 | 1 | |a Oxford : |b Oxford University Press, |c 2021 | |
| 264 | 4 | |c ©2021 | |
| 300 | |a 1 online zdroj (ix, 295 stran) | ||
| 336 | |a text |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |a počítač |b c |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |a online zdroj |b cr |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 504 | |a Obsahuje bibliografii, bibliografické odkazy a rejstřík | ||
| 505 | 0 | |a Cover -- Metaphysics, Sophistry, and Illusion: Toward a Widespread Non-Factualism -- Copyright -- Dedication -- Table of Contents -- Acknowledgments -- 1: Introduction -- 1.1 A Synopsis of This Book -- 1.2 The Ways in Which My View Is and Isn't Anti-Metaphysical -- 1.2.1 Non-Factualism as an Anti-Metaphysical View (In at Least One Way): -- 1.2.2 Two Ways in Which My View Is Not Anti-Metaphysical: -- 1.3 What I Say Here Isn't Really True -- Part I: Non-Factualism -- 2: Against Trivialism and Mere-Verbalism (and Toward a Better Understanding of the Kind of Non-Factualism Argued for in This Book) -- 2.1 Opening Remarks -- 2.2 Two (or Three) Kinds of Anti-Metaphysicalism -- 2.2.1 The First Two Kinds of Anti-Metaphysicalism: -- 2.2.2 Merely Verbal Debates: -- 2.2.3 Mere-Verbalism about Metaphysical Questions: -- 2.2.4 Relations between Mere-Verbalism, Trivialism, and Non-Factualism: -- 2.3 Non-Mere-Verbalist Non-Factualism -- 2.4 Some General Remarks about Metaphysical Problems -- 2.5 Against Metametaphysical Verbalism -- 2.5.1 A Quick Version of the Argument Against Metametaphysical Verbalism about the Temporal Ontology Debate: -- 2.5.2 Responses to Objections: -- 2.5.3 Generalizing: -- 2.6 A Recipe for Finding Non-Verbal Debates -- 2.7 Against Actual-Literature Verbalism -- 2.8 Why Trivialism Without Metametaphysical Verbalism Is Metaphysically Uninteresting -- 2.9 Two Kinds of Non-Factualism -- 3: How to Be a Fictionalist about Numbers and Tables and Just about Anything Else -- 3.1 Opening Remarks -- 3.2 The Mathematics-Based Argument Against Non-Factualism -- 3.2.1 The Argument: Consider the following thesis: -- 3.2.2 Mathematical Error Theory and Mathematical Non-Factualism: -- 3.2.3 Two Arguments for the Truth of Mathematics: -- 3.3 A Theory of Objective Fictionalistic Mathematical Correctness -- 3.3.1 C-Fictionalism:. | |
| 505 | 8 | |a 3.3.2 Refining C-fictionalism (or FBC-fictionalism): -- 3.3.3 Proto-Mathematical Truths: -- 3.3.4 Relations to Other Views: -- 3.4 FBC-Fictionalism to the Rescue -- 3.4.1 Truth in the Story of Abstract Objects as a Legitimate Kind of Objective Correctness: -- 3.4.2 Usefulness, Harmlessness, Intuitiveness, and the Quine-Putnam Argument: -- 3.5 Do FBC-Fictionalists Unwittingly Commit to Abstract Objects? -- 3.6 Generalizing the Fictionalist Strategy (or Fictionalist Views of Other Kinds of Objects) -- 3.6.1 Other Kinds of Abstract Objects: -- 3.6.2 Composite Objects: -- 3.6.3 Generalizing: -- 3.7 The Response to the Objection to Non-Factualism -- 3.8 A Recipe for Responding to Section-2.4-Style Arguments -- 3.9 A Possible Slight Alteration to What I've Said Here -- 3.10 A Worry and a Response -- 4: Non-Factualism about Composite Objects (or Why There's No Fact of the Matter Whether Any Material Objects Exist) -- 4.1 Opening Remarks -- 4.2 Is the Composition Question Trivial? -- 4.3 Against Necessitarianism -- 4.3.1 The Non-Necessity of Genuine Existence Claims: -- 4.3.2 Against Necessitarian Tableism: -- 4.3.3 Against Necessitarian Anti-Tableism: -- 4.4 Against Contingentism -- 4.5 The Law of Excluded Middle -- 4.6 From Tables to Composite Objects -- 4.7 Pushing the Argument Further -- 4.8 Un-Weird-Ing the View (at Least a Little) -- 5: Non-Factualism about Abstract Objects -- 5.1 Opening Remarks -- 5.2 The Argument for Non-Factualism: Part 1 -- 5.3 The Argument for Non-Factualism: Part 2 -- 5.4 Against Necessitarian Platonism and Anti-Platonism -- 5.4.1 Against Necessitarian Platonism: -- 5.4.2 Against Necessitarian Anti-Platonism: -- 5.4.3 Summing Up: -- 5.5 Objections and Responses -- 5.5.1 The Whatever-It's-Like Objection: -- 5.5.2 Is the Problem Just with Our Conceptual/Imaginative Resources?: -- 5.5.3 Does My Argument Show Too Much?:. | |
| 505 | 8 | |a 5.5.4 Does My Argument Really Support Anti-Platonism?: -- 5.5.5 True Counterfactuals with Catastrophically Imprecise Antecedents: -- 6: Modal Nothingism -- 6.1 Opening Remarks -- 6.2 Modal Primitivism, Analyticity, and the Lingering Truthmaking Question -- 6.3 What Is Modal Nothingism? -- 6.3.1 Initial Statement of the Theory: -- 6.3.2 Fellow Travelers: -- 6.3.3 The Scope of Modal Nothingism: -- 6.3.4 Modal Nothingism, Bruteness, and Explanation: -- 6.3.5 Epistemology: -- 6.4 How Modal Nothingism Could Be True (and How TMW Could Be False) -- 6.5 The Literali's Argument for < -- Modal Nothingism> -- -- 6.6 The Argument for Modal Nothingism -- 6.7 The Possible-Worlds Analysis and Modal Error Theory -- 6.8 Modal Literalism and Semantic Neutrality -- 6.9 Logic -- 6.10 The Counterfactuals of Chapter 3 Revisited -- 6.11 Metaphysical Possibility and Necessity -- Part II: Neo-Positivism -- 7: What Is Neo-Positivism and How Could We Argue for It? -- 7.1 Opening Remarks -- 7.2 What Is Neo-Positivism? -- 7.3 Why Neo-Positivism Isn't Self-Refuting -- 7.4 How to Argue for Neo-Positivism: The General Plan -- 7.5 Step 1 of the Neo-Positivist Argument: How to Decompose a Metaphysical Question -- 7.5.1 Initial Remarks about Decomposition: Let me start with a definition: -- 7.5.2 Step 1A-The Stipulation Maneuver: -- 7.5.3 Step 1B-The Decomposition: -- 7.6 Step 2 of the Neo-Positivist Argument -- 7.6.1 Step 2A: -- 7.6.2 An Aside: -- 7.6.3 Step 2Bi-Weeding Out the Trivial Subquestions of the Which-Kinds-ofF-Like-Things-Are-There Question: -- 7.6.4 Step 2Bii-The Non-Trivial Subquestions of the Which-Kinds-of-F-LikeThings-Are-There Question: -- 7.7 Appendix on Scientism -- 8: Conceptual Analysis -- 8.1 Opening Remarks -- 8.2 What Is a Concept? -- 8.3 Three Metaphilosophical Views -- 8.4 Why the Decompositional View Is False. | |
| 505 | 8 | |a 8.5 A Quick Argument for the Relevance of Facts about the Folk -- 8.6 Pruning the List of Fact Types that Hybrid Theorists Might Think Are Relevant -- 8.6.1 Facts about Common Nature: -- 8.6.2 Facts about Relations to Other Concepts: -- 8.7 Why the Ordinary-Language View Is Correct -- 8.7.1 Facts about the Referents of Kind Terms: -- 8.7.2 Facts about Pragmatic Usefulness: -- 8.7.3 Facts about Coherence and Instantiation: -- 8.7.4 Facts about Lewis-Sider-Style Naturalness/Joint-Carvingness: -- 8.7.5 Running out of Ideas: -- 8.8 Scientism about Conceptual-Analysis Questions -- 8.9 Five Worries -- 8.9.1 The Objection from Analyticity: -- 8.9.2 Abstract Objects: Here's a second worry one might raise about my view: -- 8.9.3 The Negative Project of X-Phi: -- 8.9.4 Excessive Hating on Intuitions and Conceptual Analysis: -- 8.9.5 Definitions: -- 8.10 Why It Wouldn't Undermine Neo-Positivism if the Hybrid View Were Right -- 8.10.1 Facts about Coherence and Instantiation Revisited: -- 8.10.2 Facts about the Referents of Kind Terms Revisited: -- 8.10.3 Facts about Pragmatic Usefulness Revisited: -- 8.10.4 Facts about Lewis-Sider-Style Joint-Carvingness Revisited: -- 8.11 If Concepts Were Mental Objects . . . -- 9: Widespread Non-Factualism -- 9.1 Opening Remarks -- 9.2 Some Examples of Non-Factualism -- 9.2.1 Properties, Tropes, and Aristotelean Universals: -- 9.2.2 Material Constitution (i.e., the Statue-Lump Question): -- 9.2.3 Essence: -- 9.2.4 Moral Realism: -- 9.2.5 Grounding Facts and Lewis-Sider-Style Joint-Carving Facts: -- 9.2.6 Presentism vs. Eternalism: -- 9.3 Some Examples of Scientism -- 9.4 Neo-Positivist Humility -- 10: A Worldview -- References -- Index. | |
| 520 | 9 | |a Metaphysics, Sophistry, and Illusion introduces a novel kind of non-factualist view, and argues that we should endorse views of this kind in connection with a wide class of metaphysical questions. It also explains how these non-factualist views fit into a general anti-metaphysical view called neo-positivism. |9 eng | |
| 533 | |a Elektronická reprodukce. |b Ann Arbor, Michigan : |c ProQuest Ebook Central, |d 2021. |n Přístup pouze pro oprávněné uživatele | ||
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| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a iluzionismus (filozofie) |7 ph376356 |2 czenas |
| 650 | 0 | 9 | |a metaphysics |2 eczenas |
| 650 | 0 | 9 | |a illusionism (philosophy) |2 eczenas |
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| 776 | 0 | 8 | |i Tištěná verze: |a Balaguer, Mark. |t Metaphysics, sophistry, and illusion : toward a widespread non-factualism |z 978-0-19-886836-1 |d Oxford : Oxford University Press USA - OSO,c2021 |
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