Non-competition interests in EU antitrust law : an empirical study of article 101 TFEU /

This book is the first to empirically study the role of non-competition interests in Article 101 TFEU enforcement.

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Hlavní autor: Brook, Or (Autor)
Typ dokumentu: Kniha
Jazyk:Angličtina
Vydáno: Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2022
Vydání:First published
Edice:Global competition law and economics policy
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On-line přístup:Elektronická verze přístupná pouze pro studenty a pracovníky MU
Příbuzné jednotky:Tištěná verze:: Non-competition interests in EU antitrust law : an empirical study of Article 101 TFEU
Obsah:
  • Cover
  • Half-title
  • Series information
  • Title page
  • Copyright information
  • Contents
  • List of Figures
  • List of Tables
  • Acknowledgements
  • List of Definitions
  • List of Abbreviations
  • 1 Introduction and Methodology
  • 1.1 Introduction
  • 1.1.1 Research Question
  • 1.1.2 Novel Approach
  • 1.1.3 Structure and Argument
  • 1.2 Definitions
  • 1.2.1 Competition and Non-Competition Interests
  • 1.2.1.1 A Narrow Definition
  • 1.2.1.2 Dialectic Approach
  • 1.2.1.3 Theoretical Justifications: The Example of Consumer Welfare
  • 1.2.1.4 Methodological Justifications
  • 1.2.2 Balancing
  • 1.2.2.1 Process: Legal Balancing, Economic Balancing, and Exclusion
  • 1.2.2.2 Remedy: Corrective and Regulatory Balancing
  • 1.2.2.3 Level of Discretion
  • 1.3 Systematic Content Analysis
  • 1.3.1 Promises and Pitfalls of Systematic Content Analysis
  • 1.3.2 The Database: Case Selection and Definitions
  • 1.3.2.1 Legal Provisions
  • 1.3.2.2 Jurisdiction Selection
  • 1.3.2.3 Sources of Information
  • 1.3.2.4 Types of Proceedings
  • 1.3.3 Coding Book
  • 2 History of Article 101 TFEU Balancing
  • 2.1 Introduction
  • 2.2 Balancing in EU Primary Law: More Questions Than Answers
  • 2.2.1 Normative Value of Competition in the EU Treaties
  • 2.2.2 Article 101 TFEU Wording and Structure: Member States Agree to Disagree
  • 2.2.3 Substantive Aspects: The Four Conditions of Article 101(3) TFEU
  • 2.2.3.1 First Condition: Benefit
  • 2.2.3.2 Second Condition: Fair Share
  • 2.2.3.3 Third Condition: Indispensability
  • 2.2.3.4 Fourth Condition: Elimination of Competition
  • 2.3 Balancing in EU Secondary Law: Between Notifications and Self-Assessment
  • 2.3.1 Notification-Centralised Regime of Regulation 17/62
  • 2.3.2 Blessing and Curse: Consequences of Regulation 17/62
  • 2.3.3 Modernisation of Competition Law
  • 2.3.3.1 Origin and Reactions to the White Paper.
  • 2.3.3.2 Point of Contention: EU and National Competition Laws
  • 2.3.3.3 Commission's and NCAs' Role under Regulation 1/2003
  • 2.4 EU Courts' Role in Shaping Balancing
  • 2.5 Balancing in Practice I: The Commission's Approach
  • 2.5.1 First Enforcement Period (1962-1977): The Foundation Period
  • 2.5.1.1 Balancing Guided by Keynesian Theories
  • 2.5.1.2 Market Integration as the Primary Aim
  • 2.5.2 Second Enforcement Period (1978-1987): Workable Competition
  • 2.5.2.1 Workable Competition Standard and Regulatory Balancing
  • 2.5.2.2 Balancing in Times of Economic Crisis
  • 2.5.3 Third Enforcement Period (1988-April 2004): Economic, Social, and Political EU
  • 2.5.3.1 Sectoral Approach
  • 2.5.3.2 Policy-Linking Clauses
  • 2.5.3.3 First Seeds of the More Economic Approach
  • 2.5.4 Fourth Enforcement Period (May 2004-2017): Post-Modernisation Era
  • 2.5.4.1 Institutional Pillar of Modernisation (Decentralisation)
  • 2.5.4.2 Substantive Pillar of Modernisation (1): White Paper
  • 2.5.4.3 Substantive Pillar of Modernisation (2): Commission's Guidelines
  • 2.5.4.4 Substantive Pillar of Modernisation (3): Consumer Welfare
  • 2.5.4.5 Procedural Pillar of Modernisation: Self-Assessment and Enforcement Discretion
  • 2.6 Balancing in Practice II: The Five Member States
  • 2.6.1 France
  • 2.6.1.1 Origins of National Competition Law
  • 2.6.1.2 National Equivalent of Article 101 TFEU and Consumer Welfare Standard
  • 2.6.1.3 National Enforcement System
  • 2.6.2 Germany
  • 2.6.2.1 Origins of National Competition Law
  • 2.6.2.2 National Equivalent of Article 101 TFEU and Consumer Welfare Standard
  • 2.6.2.3 National Enforcement System
  • 2.6.3 The Netherlands
  • 2.6.3.1 Origins of National Competition Law
  • 2.6.3.2 National Equivalent of Article 101 TFEU and Consumer Welfare Standard
  • 2.6.3.3 National Enforcement System
  • 2.6.4 UK.
  • 2.6.4.1 Origins of National Competition Law
  • 2.6.4.2 National Equivalent of Article 101 TFEU and Consumer Welfare Standard
  • 2.6.4.3 National Enforcement System
  • 2.6.5 Hungary
  • 2.6.5.1 Origins of the National Competition Law
  • 2.6.5.2 National Equivalent of Article 101 TFEU and the Consumer Welfare Standard
  • 2.6.5.3 National Enforcement System
  • 2.7 Non-Competition Interests under Article 101 TFEU: An Open Question
  • 3 Article 101(3) TFEU: Individual Exemptions
  • 3.1 Introduction
  • 3.2 Legal and Empirical Background
  • 3.3 Types of Benefits
  • 3.3.1 Overview
  • 3.3.1.1 Improving the Production or Distribution of Goods or Promoting Technical or Economic Progress
  • 3.3.1.2 Economic and Non-Economic Benefits
  • 3.3.2 First Enforcement Period: Industrial Policy
  • 3.3.3 Second and Third Enforcement Periods: Broadening the Types of Benefits
  • 3.3.3.1 Metro I and the Workable Competition Standard
  • 3.3.3.2 The Irrelevance of the Policy-Linking Clauses
  • 3.3.3.3 Relevant Types of Beneficiaries
  • 3.3.3.4 The Case of Environmental Agreements
  • 3.3.3.5 Non-Economic Benefits as an Additional Justification
  • 3.3.4 Fourth Enforcement Period: Limiting the Types of Benefits and Beneficiaries
  • 3.3.4.1 The Commission's Policy Papers
  • 3.3.4.2 The Commission's Practice
  • 3.3.5 Interim Conclusion
  • 3.4 The Balancing Method
  • 3.4.1 Overview
  • 3.4.2 First Enforcement Period: Market Integration and the First Benefit Condition
  • 3.4.3 Second and Third Enforcement Periods: Sectoral Approach and the Third Indispensability Condition
  • 3.4.3.1 The Workable Competition Standard as a Balancing Method
  • 3.4.3.2 Market Integration
  • 3.4.3.3 Liberalised and Regulated Markets
  • 3.4.3.4 Sectors Affected by Economic Crisis
  • 3.4.3.5 Industrial Policy
  • 3.4.4 Fourth Enforcement Period: Consumer Welfare and Economic Evidence.
  • 3.4.4.1 Short-Term Narrow Consumer Welfare Standard
  • 3.4.4.2 Robust Economic Evidence
  • 3.4.4.3 Focus on the First Benefit Condition
  • 3.4.4.4 Hard-Core and By-Object Restrictions
  • 3.4.5 Interim Conclusion
  • 3.5 EU Courts
  • 3.5.1 Overview
  • 3.5.2 From an Active Role Prior to Modernisation to a Passive Role
  • 3.5.3 Not Fully Endorsing the Commission's New Approach
  • 3.5.3.1 Types of Benefits
  • 3.5.3.2 Balancing Method
  • 3.5.4 Interim Conclusion
  • 3.6 NCAs and National Courts
  • 3.6.1 Overview
  • 3.6.2 Types of Benefits and Balancing Method
  • 3.6.2.1 Economic Benefits and Short-Term Narrow Consumer Welfare (UK and Hungary)
  • 3.6.2.2 Non-Economic Benefits and Long-Term Broad Consumer Welfare (the Netherlands and France)
  • 3.6.2.3 Rejecting the Consumer Welfare Standard (Germany)
  • 3.6.3 Intensity of Control
  • 3.6.3.1 Strict Control (UK, Germany, and Hungary)
  • 3.6.3.2 Varying Control (the Netherlands and France)
  • 3.6.4 National Equivalent Provisions
  • 3.6.5 National Courts
  • 3.6.6 Interim Conclusion
  • 3.7 Closing Remarks: Transitions in Article 101(3) TFEU Balancing
  • 4 Block Exemption Regulations
  • 4.1 Introduction
  • 4.2 Legal and Empirical Background
  • 4.3 BERs as a Balancing Tool
  • 4.3.1 Type of Benefit: General and Sectoral
  • 4.3.1.1 General BERs
  • 4.3.1.2 Sectoral BERs
  • 4.3.2 The Balancing Method
  • 4.3.2.1 Adopting BERs
  • 4.3.2.2 Applying BERs
  • 4.3.3 Modernising BERs
  • 4.3.3.1 From Form-Based to Effects-Based Balancing
  • 4.3.3.2 Questioning the Theoretical Justification of Sectoral BERs
  • 4.3.4 Interim Conclusion
  • 4.4 NCAs and National Courts
  • 4.4.1 NCAs
  • 4.4.1.1 EU and Mixed Cases
  • 4.4.1.2 Purely National Cases
  • 4.4.1.3 National BERs
  • 4.4.2 National Courts
  • 4.4.3 Interim Conclusion
  • 4.5 Relationship between BERs and Individual Exemption Balancing.
  • 4.5.1 Individual Exemption Granted after BER Refused
  • 4.5.2 Withdrawal of BERs
  • 4.6 Closing Remarks: Transitions in BERs Balancing
  • 5 Article 101(1) TFEU
  • 5.1 Introduction
  • 5.1.1 Between a Jurisdictional Provision and a Balancing Tool
  • 5.1.2 Between the Theory of Harm and a Balancing Tool
  • 5.1.3 Two Categories of Article 101(1) TFEU Balancing Tools
  • 5.2 Balancing Competition and State or Public Interests
  • 5.2.1 Legal and Empirical Background
  • 5.2.2 State Action Defence
  • 5.2.2.1 Balancing Tool
  • 5.2.2.2 Balancing Method (1): State Requiring or Favouring Anti-competitive Agreements
  • 5.2.2.3 Balancing Method (2): State Reinforcing an Anti-competitive Agreement
  • 5.2.2.4 Balancing Method (3): Delegation of State Powers
  • 5.2.2.5 Modernising the State Action Defence
  • 5.2.3 Article 106(2) TFEU
  • 5.2.3.1 Types of Benefits
  • 5.2.3.2 Balancing Method
  • 5.2.4 Notion of Undertakings
  • 5.2.4.1 Types of Benefits
  • 5.2.4.2 Balancing Method
  • 5.2.5 'Nature and Purpose': Collective Bargaining Agreements
  • 5.2.5.1 Types of Benefits
  • 5.2.5.2 Balancing Method
  • 5.2.6 Inherent Restriction
  • 5.2.6.1 Types of Benefits
  • 5.2.6.2 Balancing Method
  • 5.2.7 Interim Conclusion
  • 5.3 Balancing Competition and Commercial Interests
  • 5.3.1 Legal and Empirical Background
  • 5.3.2 EU Rule of Reason
  • 5.3.3 Objectively Necessary Agreement
  • 5.3.4 Ancillary Restraints
  • 5.3.5 IPRs
  • 5.3.6 De Minimis
  • 5.3.7 Interim Conclusion
  • 5.4 NCAs and National Courts
  • 5.4.1 NCAs
  • 5.4.1.1 Overview
  • 5.4.1.2 Types of Benefits
  • 5.4.1.3 Balancing Method
  • 5.4.1.4 Intensity of Control
  • 5.4.2 National Courts
  • 5.5 Closing remarks: Transitions in Article 101(1) TFEU Balancing
  • 6 National Balancing Tools
  • 6.1 Introduction
  • 6.2 Legal and Empirical Background
  • 6.3 Balancing Tools
  • 6.3.1 Low Discretion, Economic Benefits.
  • 6.3.2 High Discretion, Economic Benefits.