Non-competition interests in EU antitrust law : an empirical study of article 101 TFEU /
This book is the first to empirically study the role of non-competition interests in Article 101 TFEU enforcement.
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Hlavní autor: | |
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Typ dokumentu: | Kniha |
Jazyk: | Angličtina |
Vydáno: |
Cambridge :
Cambridge University Press,
2022
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Vydání: | First published |
Edice: | Global competition law and economics policy
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Témata: | |
On-line přístup: | Elektronická verze přístupná pouze pro studenty a pracovníky MU |
Příbuzné jednotky: | Tištěná verze::
Non-competition interests in EU antitrust law : an empirical study of Article 101 TFEU |
Obsah:
- Cover
- Half-title
- Series information
- Title page
- Copyright information
- Contents
- List of Figures
- List of Tables
- Acknowledgements
- List of Definitions
- List of Abbreviations
- 1 Introduction and Methodology
- 1.1 Introduction
- 1.1.1 Research Question
- 1.1.2 Novel Approach
- 1.1.3 Structure and Argument
- 1.2 Definitions
- 1.2.1 Competition and Non-Competition Interests
- 1.2.1.1 A Narrow Definition
- 1.2.1.2 Dialectic Approach
- 1.2.1.3 Theoretical Justifications: The Example of Consumer Welfare
- 1.2.1.4 Methodological Justifications
- 1.2.2 Balancing
- 1.2.2.1 Process: Legal Balancing, Economic Balancing, and Exclusion
- 1.2.2.2 Remedy: Corrective and Regulatory Balancing
- 1.2.2.3 Level of Discretion
- 1.3 Systematic Content Analysis
- 1.3.1 Promises and Pitfalls of Systematic Content Analysis
- 1.3.2 The Database: Case Selection and Definitions
- 1.3.2.1 Legal Provisions
- 1.3.2.2 Jurisdiction Selection
- 1.3.2.3 Sources of Information
- 1.3.2.4 Types of Proceedings
- 1.3.3 Coding Book
- 2 History of Article 101 TFEU Balancing
- 2.1 Introduction
- 2.2 Balancing in EU Primary Law: More Questions Than Answers
- 2.2.1 Normative Value of Competition in the EU Treaties
- 2.2.2 Article 101 TFEU Wording and Structure: Member States Agree to Disagree
- 2.2.3 Substantive Aspects: The Four Conditions of Article 101(3) TFEU
- 2.2.3.1 First Condition: Benefit
- 2.2.3.2 Second Condition: Fair Share
- 2.2.3.3 Third Condition: Indispensability
- 2.2.3.4 Fourth Condition: Elimination of Competition
- 2.3 Balancing in EU Secondary Law: Between Notifications and Self-Assessment
- 2.3.1 Notification-Centralised Regime of Regulation 17/62
- 2.3.2 Blessing and Curse: Consequences of Regulation 17/62
- 2.3.3 Modernisation of Competition Law
- 2.3.3.1 Origin and Reactions to the White Paper.
- 2.3.3.2 Point of Contention: EU and National Competition Laws
- 2.3.3.3 Commission's and NCAs' Role under Regulation 1/2003
- 2.4 EU Courts' Role in Shaping Balancing
- 2.5 Balancing in Practice I: The Commission's Approach
- 2.5.1 First Enforcement Period (1962-1977): The Foundation Period
- 2.5.1.1 Balancing Guided by Keynesian Theories
- 2.5.1.2 Market Integration as the Primary Aim
- 2.5.2 Second Enforcement Period (1978-1987): Workable Competition
- 2.5.2.1 Workable Competition Standard and Regulatory Balancing
- 2.5.2.2 Balancing in Times of Economic Crisis
- 2.5.3 Third Enforcement Period (1988-April 2004): Economic, Social, and Political EU
- 2.5.3.1 Sectoral Approach
- 2.5.3.2 Policy-Linking Clauses
- 2.5.3.3 First Seeds of the More Economic Approach
- 2.5.4 Fourth Enforcement Period (May 2004-2017): Post-Modernisation Era
- 2.5.4.1 Institutional Pillar of Modernisation (Decentralisation)
- 2.5.4.2 Substantive Pillar of Modernisation (1): White Paper
- 2.5.4.3 Substantive Pillar of Modernisation (2): Commission's Guidelines
- 2.5.4.4 Substantive Pillar of Modernisation (3): Consumer Welfare
- 2.5.4.5 Procedural Pillar of Modernisation: Self-Assessment and Enforcement Discretion
- 2.6 Balancing in Practice II: The Five Member States
- 2.6.1 France
- 2.6.1.1 Origins of National Competition Law
- 2.6.1.2 National Equivalent of Article 101 TFEU and Consumer Welfare Standard
- 2.6.1.3 National Enforcement System
- 2.6.2 Germany
- 2.6.2.1 Origins of National Competition Law
- 2.6.2.2 National Equivalent of Article 101 TFEU and Consumer Welfare Standard
- 2.6.2.3 National Enforcement System
- 2.6.3 The Netherlands
- 2.6.3.1 Origins of National Competition Law
- 2.6.3.2 National Equivalent of Article 101 TFEU and Consumer Welfare Standard
- 2.6.3.3 National Enforcement System
- 2.6.4 UK.
- 2.6.4.1 Origins of National Competition Law
- 2.6.4.2 National Equivalent of Article 101 TFEU and Consumer Welfare Standard
- 2.6.4.3 National Enforcement System
- 2.6.5 Hungary
- 2.6.5.1 Origins of the National Competition Law
- 2.6.5.2 National Equivalent of Article 101 TFEU and the Consumer Welfare Standard
- 2.6.5.3 National Enforcement System
- 2.7 Non-Competition Interests under Article 101 TFEU: An Open Question
- 3 Article 101(3) TFEU: Individual Exemptions
- 3.1 Introduction
- 3.2 Legal and Empirical Background
- 3.3 Types of Benefits
- 3.3.1 Overview
- 3.3.1.1 Improving the Production or Distribution of Goods or Promoting Technical or Economic Progress
- 3.3.1.2 Economic and Non-Economic Benefits
- 3.3.2 First Enforcement Period: Industrial Policy
- 3.3.3 Second and Third Enforcement Periods: Broadening the Types of Benefits
- 3.3.3.1 Metro I and the Workable Competition Standard
- 3.3.3.2 The Irrelevance of the Policy-Linking Clauses
- 3.3.3.3 Relevant Types of Beneficiaries
- 3.3.3.4 The Case of Environmental Agreements
- 3.3.3.5 Non-Economic Benefits as an Additional Justification
- 3.3.4 Fourth Enforcement Period: Limiting the Types of Benefits and Beneficiaries
- 3.3.4.1 The Commission's Policy Papers
- 3.3.4.2 The Commission's Practice
- 3.3.5 Interim Conclusion
- 3.4 The Balancing Method
- 3.4.1 Overview
- 3.4.2 First Enforcement Period: Market Integration and the First Benefit Condition
- 3.4.3 Second and Third Enforcement Periods: Sectoral Approach and the Third Indispensability Condition
- 3.4.3.1 The Workable Competition Standard as a Balancing Method
- 3.4.3.2 Market Integration
- 3.4.3.3 Liberalised and Regulated Markets
- 3.4.3.4 Sectors Affected by Economic Crisis
- 3.4.3.5 Industrial Policy
- 3.4.4 Fourth Enforcement Period: Consumer Welfare and Economic Evidence.
- 3.4.4.1 Short-Term Narrow Consumer Welfare Standard
- 3.4.4.2 Robust Economic Evidence
- 3.4.4.3 Focus on the First Benefit Condition
- 3.4.4.4 Hard-Core and By-Object Restrictions
- 3.4.5 Interim Conclusion
- 3.5 EU Courts
- 3.5.1 Overview
- 3.5.2 From an Active Role Prior to Modernisation to a Passive Role
- 3.5.3 Not Fully Endorsing the Commission's New Approach
- 3.5.3.1 Types of Benefits
- 3.5.3.2 Balancing Method
- 3.5.4 Interim Conclusion
- 3.6 NCAs and National Courts
- 3.6.1 Overview
- 3.6.2 Types of Benefits and Balancing Method
- 3.6.2.1 Economic Benefits and Short-Term Narrow Consumer Welfare (UK and Hungary)
- 3.6.2.2 Non-Economic Benefits and Long-Term Broad Consumer Welfare (the Netherlands and France)
- 3.6.2.3 Rejecting the Consumer Welfare Standard (Germany)
- 3.6.3 Intensity of Control
- 3.6.3.1 Strict Control (UK, Germany, and Hungary)
- 3.6.3.2 Varying Control (the Netherlands and France)
- 3.6.4 National Equivalent Provisions
- 3.6.5 National Courts
- 3.6.6 Interim Conclusion
- 3.7 Closing Remarks: Transitions in Article 101(3) TFEU Balancing
- 4 Block Exemption Regulations
- 4.1 Introduction
- 4.2 Legal and Empirical Background
- 4.3 BERs as a Balancing Tool
- 4.3.1 Type of Benefit: General and Sectoral
- 4.3.1.1 General BERs
- 4.3.1.2 Sectoral BERs
- 4.3.2 The Balancing Method
- 4.3.2.1 Adopting BERs
- 4.3.2.2 Applying BERs
- 4.3.3 Modernising BERs
- 4.3.3.1 From Form-Based to Effects-Based Balancing
- 4.3.3.2 Questioning the Theoretical Justification of Sectoral BERs
- 4.3.4 Interim Conclusion
- 4.4 NCAs and National Courts
- 4.4.1 NCAs
- 4.4.1.1 EU and Mixed Cases
- 4.4.1.2 Purely National Cases
- 4.4.1.3 National BERs
- 4.4.2 National Courts
- 4.4.3 Interim Conclusion
- 4.5 Relationship between BERs and Individual Exemption Balancing.
- 4.5.1 Individual Exemption Granted after BER Refused
- 4.5.2 Withdrawal of BERs
- 4.6 Closing Remarks: Transitions in BERs Balancing
- 5 Article 101(1) TFEU
- 5.1 Introduction
- 5.1.1 Between a Jurisdictional Provision and a Balancing Tool
- 5.1.2 Between the Theory of Harm and a Balancing Tool
- 5.1.3 Two Categories of Article 101(1) TFEU Balancing Tools
- 5.2 Balancing Competition and State or Public Interests
- 5.2.1 Legal and Empirical Background
- 5.2.2 State Action Defence
- 5.2.2.1 Balancing Tool
- 5.2.2.2 Balancing Method (1): State Requiring or Favouring Anti-competitive Agreements
- 5.2.2.3 Balancing Method (2): State Reinforcing an Anti-competitive Agreement
- 5.2.2.4 Balancing Method (3): Delegation of State Powers
- 5.2.2.5 Modernising the State Action Defence
- 5.2.3 Article 106(2) TFEU
- 5.2.3.1 Types of Benefits
- 5.2.3.2 Balancing Method
- 5.2.4 Notion of Undertakings
- 5.2.4.1 Types of Benefits
- 5.2.4.2 Balancing Method
- 5.2.5 'Nature and Purpose': Collective Bargaining Agreements
- 5.2.5.1 Types of Benefits
- 5.2.5.2 Balancing Method
- 5.2.6 Inherent Restriction
- 5.2.6.1 Types of Benefits
- 5.2.6.2 Balancing Method
- 5.2.7 Interim Conclusion
- 5.3 Balancing Competition and Commercial Interests
- 5.3.1 Legal and Empirical Background
- 5.3.2 EU Rule of Reason
- 5.3.3 Objectively Necessary Agreement
- 5.3.4 Ancillary Restraints
- 5.3.5 IPRs
- 5.3.6 De Minimis
- 5.3.7 Interim Conclusion
- 5.4 NCAs and National Courts
- 5.4.1 NCAs
- 5.4.1.1 Overview
- 5.4.1.2 Types of Benefits
- 5.4.1.3 Balancing Method
- 5.4.1.4 Intensity of Control
- 5.4.2 National Courts
- 5.5 Closing remarks: Transitions in Article 101(1) TFEU Balancing
- 6 National Balancing Tools
- 6.1 Introduction
- 6.2 Legal and Empirical Background
- 6.3 Balancing Tools
- 6.3.1 Low Discretion, Economic Benefits.
- 6.3.2 High Discretion, Economic Benefits.