Private international law : idealism, pragmatism, eclecticism /

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Hlavní autor: Symeonides, Symeon, 1949- (Autor)
Typ dokumentu: Kniha
Jazyk:Angličtina
Vydáno: Leiden : Brill, 2021
Edice:Hague Academy of International Law Monographs
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On-line přístup:Elektronická verze přístupná pouze pro studenty a pracovníky MU
Příbuzné jednotky:Tištěná verze:: Private international law : idealism, pragmatism, eclecticism
Obsah:
  • Intro
  • The Hague Academy of International Law: Private International Law Idealism, Pragmatism, Eclecticism
  • Copyright
  • Dedication
  • Table of Contents
  • Biographical Note
  • Principal Publications
  • Abbreviations
  • List of PIL Codifications
  • List of EU Regulations
  • List of International Conventions
  • List of Tables and Charts
  • Foreword
  • Introduction
  • Chapter I Historical Foundations
  • Section 1. Introduction
  • Section 2. From Ancient Greece to Medieval Italy
  • Section 3. Early Footings: Bartolus, Statutists, and Unilateralism
  • Section 4. Huber's Comity
  • Section 5. The Nineteenth Century: The Classical PIL Edifice
  • A. Story
  • B. Wächter
  • C. Savigny and Multilateralism
  • D. Other Nineteenth Century Scholars
  • Section 6. The Twentieth Century
  • A. The Two Halves
  • B. Beale and the Traditional American Choice-of-Law System
  • 1. Territoriality
  • 2. Vested Rights
  • 3. The First Conflicts Restatement
  • Section 7. Summary: The Classical PIL System
  • Section 8. The Recent Codification Movement
  • Chapter II. Substantivist Carve-Outs
  • Section 1. The Original Substantivist Method
  • Section 2. Contemporary Substantivist Carve-Outs
  • A. Legislative Substantivism
  • 1. Internationally
  • 2. Regionally
  • 3. Nationally
  • B. Non-State, Anational Substantivism
  • C. Substantivism in Arbitration
  • D. Substantivism in Adjudication
  • Section 3. Summary
  • Chapter III. The "International" in Private International Law
  • Section 1. What's in a Name?
  • A. Conflict of Laws
  • B. Private International Law
  • Section 2. Internationality
  • Section 3. International Uniformity
  • Section 4. Interstate Uniformity
  • Section 5. Conclusions
  • Chapter IV. The "Private" in Private International Law
  • Section 1. Introduction: Private or Public Law?
  • Section 2. Brainerd Currie and State Interests
  • A. Introduction.
  • B. Do States Have an Interest in Multistate Disputes between Private
  • C. Are State Interests Ascertainable?
  • D. Re-conceptualizing State Interests
  • E. Can an Interest-Based Approach Rationally Resolve Conflicts?
  • 1. False Conflicts
  • 2. True Conflicts
  • 3. No-Interest Cases
  • F. Summary
  • Section 3. Not "Only in America": Recognition of State Interests Elsewhere
  • A. Not for Export
  • B. Unilateralist Tools
  • C. Multilateral but Non-Neutral Rules
  • D. Constitutionalization of PIL
  • Section 4. Conclusions
  • Chapter V. Unilateralist Encroachments
  • Section 1. Introduction
  • A. Misplaced Labels
  • B. History
  • C. The Differences
  • Section 2. The Resilience of Unilateralism
  • Section 3. Unilateralism in Academic Doctrine
  • A. In Europe
  • B. In the United States
  • Section 4. Not "Only in America": The Ubiquity of Unilateralism
  • A. Unilateral Choice-of-Law Rules in PIL Codifications
  • 1. Old-Fashioned, General Unilateral Rules
  • 2. Unilateral Rules for Tort Conflicts
  • 3. Multiple Nationalities
  • 4. Capacity
  • 5. Marriage
  • 6. Divorce
  • 7. Adoption
  • 8. Maintenance
  • 9. Successions
  • 10. Formal Validity
  • 11. Contracts
  • 12. Intellectual Property
  • 13. Mea Culpa
  • B. Mandatory Rules, or Rules of Immediate Application
  • C. Unilateralism in Substantive Statutes
  • 1. "Localizing Rules": Concept and Function
  • 2. Consumer Contracts
  • 3. Insurance contracts
  • 4. Employment Contracts
  • 5. Franchise, Distributorship, and Commercial Agency Contracts
  • 6. Other Contracts
  • 7. Antitrust
  • Section 5. Symbiosis
  • A. Unilateralism is Alive and Kicking
  • B. Methodological Implications: From Antagonism to Symbiosis
  • C. Unilateralism and Parochialism
  • D. The Unilaterality of Multilateralism
  • E. Comparison
  • F. Combining Multilateralism with Accommodative Unilateralism.
  • Chapter VI. The Material Tempering of Conflicts Justice
  • Section 1. The Question
  • Section 2. The Orthodox Answer: "Conflicts Justice"
  • Section 3. The Heretical Answer: "Material Justice"
  • A. The Thesis
  • B. Relation with Other Approaches
  • C. The American Version
  • 1. David F. Cavers
  • 2. Robert A. Leflar
  • a. Leflar's Approach
  • b. Judicial Reception
  • 3. Other American Authors
  • D. European Perspectives
  • Section 4. Covert Result Selectivism in the Courts
  • Section 5. Overt Result Selectivism in Legislation
  • A. Introduction
  • B. Result-Selective Choice-of-Law Rules in General
  • C. Rules Favoring the Validity of Certain Juridical Acts (favor validitatis)
  • 1. Testaments (favor testamenti)
  • a. Formal Validity
  • b. Substantive Validity
  • 2. Other Juridical Acts (favor negotii)
  • a. Formal Validity
  • b. Capacity
  • D. Rules Favoring a Certain Status
  • 1. Legitimacy (favor legitimationis)
  • 2. Filiation (favor infantis)
  • 3. Acknowledgment
  • 4. Adoption
  • 5. Marriage (favor matrimonii)
  • 6. Divorce (favor divortii)
  • E. Rules Favoring One Party: Choice of Law by, or for the Benefit of, One Party
  • 1. Pre-Dispute Choice by One Party
  • 2. Post-dispute Choice by, or for the Benefit of One Party
  • a. Cross-Border Torts
  • (1) Favor Laesi for All Cross-Border Torts
  • (2) Favor Laesi in Products Liability
  • (3) Favor Laesi in Other Cross-Border Torts
  • (4) Summary
  • b. Choice by Owner of Stolen Property
  • c. Choice by Unwed Mother
  • d. Court Choice for the Benefit of Maintenance Obligees
  • e. Court Choice for the Benefit of Children and Other Weak Parties
  • 3. Protecting Consumers or Employees from the Consequences of an Adverse Choice-of-Law Clause
  • Section 6. Conclusions
  • A. Summary
  • B. Not "Only in America"
  • C. Result Selectivism in Legislation and Adjudication
  • D. Exceptional?.
  • Chapter VII. The Softening of Concepts and Rules
  • Section 1. Introduction
  • Section 2. The Virtual Abandonment of Connecting Factors in the United States
  • Section 3. Not "Only in America": The Softening of Connecting Factors in Recent Codifications
  • A. The Closer or Closest Connection
  • 1. The Closest Connection as the Principal Connecting Factor
  • 2. The Closest Connection in Specific Roles
  • a. The Closest Connection as a Presumption in Contract Conflicts, Subject to a Closer-Connection Escape
  • b. The Closest Connection as a Presumption in Tort Conflicts Subject to a Closer-Connection Escape
  • c. The Closest Connection as a Connecting Factor in Other Conflicts
  • d. Close Connection and Mandatory Rules
  • e. The Closest Connection as a Tiebreaker
  • f. The Closest Connection as a Pointer in Cases Involving a Federal or Other Plurilegal State
  • g. The Closest Connection as a Gap-Filler for Unprovided-For Cases
  • B. Other Soft Connecting Factors
  • Section 4. Escape Clauses
  • A. General Escapes
  • B. Specific Escapes
  • 1. Escapes Based on the "Closer Connection"
  • 2. Escapes Based On Other Factors
  • C. Assessment of Escapes
  • 1. Too Much Geography, Too Little Principle
  • 2. Issue-by-Issue Deployment
  • Section 5. The Movement toward Flexibility
  • A. The Perennial Tension
  • B. The American Overreaction
  • C. Corrective Action
  • D. A Cautious Evolution
  • E. Codification and Flexibility
  • Section 6. Conclusions
  • Chapter VIII. The Narrowing of Legal Categories
  • Section 1. The Classical Model: "Legal Relations"
  • Section 2. American Developments
  • A. From Broad Categories to Issues
  • B. Issue-by-Issue Analysis
  • C. Dépeçage
  • 1. What Is Dépeçage?
  • 2. What Dépeçage Is Not
  • 3. In the Abstract, Dépeçage is Neither Good nor Bad
  • 4. Occasionally, Dépeçage Is Problematic
  • 5. Dépeçage in Practice.
  • Section 3. Not "Only in America": Dépeçage in Codified PIL Systems
  • Section 4. Dépeçage in the Rome Convention and the Rome Regulations
  • A. Rome Convention and Rome I Regulation
  • B. Rome II
  • Section 5. Dépeçage in Other Modern Codifications
  • A. Statutory and Voluntary Dépeçage
  • 1. Contracts
  • a. Statutory Dépeçage
  • b. Voluntary Dépeçage
  • 2. Torts
  • 3. Marriage
  • 4. Matrimonial Property Regimes
  • 5. Successions
  • 6. Trusts
  • B. Judicial Dépeçage
  • 1. Preliminary or Incidental Question
  • 2. Ordre Public
  • 3. Mandatory Rules
  • 4. Escape Clauses
  • Section 6. Conclusions
  • Chapter IX. Party Autonomy
  • Section 1. Introduction
  • Section 2. The History of Party Autonomy
  • A. An Example from Antiquity
  • B. The Parties' Implied Intention and the Lex Loci Solutionis
  • C. Party Autonomy as an a Priori Rule: Mancini
  • D. Legislative Endorsements in the Nineteenth Century
  • E. The First Half of the Twentieth Century
  • F. The Subsequent Triumph and Contemporary Dominance of Party Autonomy
  • Section 3. The Scope of Party Autonomy
  • A. Exemptions from Scope
  • B. Contractual and Non-Contractual Issues
  • C. Substantive vs Procedural Law
  • D. Substantive Law vs PIL
  • E. State Law vs Non-State Norms
  • Section 4. Limitations to Party Autonomy within its Delineated Scope
  • A. Determining the Lex Limitativa
  • 1. Group 1: Lex Fori (Exclusively)
  • 2. Group 2: The Lex Causae (Primarily)
  • 3. Group 3: Intermediate Solutions and Combinations
  • a. Rome I
  • b. Other Systems
  • c. The Hague Principles
  • B. The Triggering Thresholds and Gradations of Limitations to Party Autonomy
  • 1. The Ordre Public of the Lex Fori
  • 2. The "Overriding" Mandatory Rules of the Lex Fori
  • 3. The Public Policy of the Lex Causae
  • 4. The "Simple" Mandatory Rules
  • 5. No Threshold
  • Section 5. Conclusions.
  • Chapter X. The Challenge of the Internet.