Value theory /
What is it for a car, a piece of art or a person to be good, bad or better than another? In this first book-length introduction to value theory, Francesco Orsi explores the nature of evaluative concepts used in everyday thinking and speech and in contemporary philosophical discourse. The various dim...
Uloženo v:
Hlavní autor: | |
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Typ dokumentu: | Kniha |
Jazyk: | Angličtina |
Vydáno: |
London :
Bloomsbury,
2015
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Vydání: | First published |
Edice: | Bloomsbury ethics
|
Témata: | |
On-line přístup: | Elektronická verze přístupná pouze pro studenty a pracovníky MU |
Příbuzné jednotky: | Tištěná verze::
Value theory |
Obsah:
- 1. Value and Normativity
- 1.1 Introduction
- 1.2 Which Evaluations?
- 1.3 The Idea of Value Theory
- 1.4 Value and Normativity
- 1.5 Overview
- 1.6 Meta-ethical Neutrality
- 1.7 Value Theory: The Questions
- 2. Meet the Values: Intrinsic, Final & Co.
- 2.1 Introduction
- 2.2 Final and Unconditional Value: Some Philosophical Examples
- 2.3 Intrinsic Value and Final Value
- 2.4 The Reduction to Facts
- 2.5 Intrinsic and Conditional Value
- 2.6 Elimination of Extrinsic Value?
- 2.7 Summary
- 3. The Challenge against Absolute Value
- 3.1 Introduction
- 3.2 Geach and Attributive Goodness
- 3.3 Foot and the Virtues
- 3.4 Thomson and Goodness in a Way
- 3.5 Zimmerman's Ethical Goodness
- 3.6 A Better Reply: Absolute Value and Fitting Attitudes
- 3.7 Summary
- 4. Personal Value
- 4.1 Introduction
- 4.2 Moore on Good and Good For
- 4.3 Good For and Fitting Attitudes
- 4.4 Moore Strikes Back? -4.5 Agent-relative Value
- 4.6 Impersonal/Personal and Agent-neutral/Agent-relative
- 4.7 Summary
- 5. The Chemistry of Value
- 5.1 Introduction
- 5.2 Supervenience and Other Relations
- 5.3 Organic Unities
- 5.4 Alternatives to Organic Unities: Virtual Value
- 5.5 Alternatives to Organic Unities: Conditional Value
- 5.6 Holism and Particularism
- 5.7 Summary
- 6. Value Relations
- 6.1 Introduction
- 6.2 The Trichotomy Thesis and Incomparability
- 6.3 A Fitting Attitude Argument for Incomparability
- 6.4 Against Incomparability: Epistemic Limitations
- 6.5 Against Incomparability: Parity
- 6.6 Parity and Choice
- 6.7 Parity and Incomparability
- 6.8 Summary
- 7. How Do I Favour Thee?
- 7.1 Introduction
- 7.2 Three Dimensions of Favouring
- 7.3 Responses to Value: Maximizing
- 7.4 Two Concepts of Intrinsic Value?
- 7.5 Summary
- 8. Value and the Wrong Kind of Reasons
- 8.1 Introduction
- 8.2 The Fitting Attitude Account and its Rivals
- 8.3 The Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem
- 8.4 The Structure of the Problem and an Initial Response
- 8.5 Reasons for What?
- 8.6 Characteristic Concerns and Shared Reasons
- 8.7 Circular Path: No-Priority
- 8.8 Summary.