Value theory /

What is it for a car, a piece of art or a person to be good, bad or better than another? In this first book-length introduction to value theory, Francesco Orsi explores the nature of evaluative concepts used in everyday thinking and speech and in contemporary philosophical discourse. The various dim...

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Hlavní autor: Orsi, Francesco (Autor)
Typ dokumentu: Kniha
Jazyk:Angličtina
Vydáno: London : Bloomsbury, 2015
Vydání:First published
Edice:Bloomsbury ethics
Témata:
On-line přístup:Elektronická verze přístupná pouze pro studenty a pracovníky MU
Příbuzné jednotky:Tištěná verze:: Value theory
Obsah:
  • 1. Value and Normativity
  • 1.1 Introduction
  • 1.2 Which Evaluations?
  • 1.3 The Idea of Value Theory
  • 1.4 Value and Normativity
  • 1.5 Overview
  • 1.6 Meta-ethical Neutrality
  • 1.7 Value Theory: The Questions
  • 2. Meet the Values: Intrinsic, Final & Co.
  • 2.1 Introduction
  • 2.2 Final and Unconditional Value: Some Philosophical Examples
  • 2.3 Intrinsic Value and Final Value
  • 2.4 The Reduction to Facts
  • 2.5 Intrinsic and Conditional Value
  • 2.6 Elimination of Extrinsic Value?
  • 2.7 Summary
  • 3. The Challenge against Absolute Value
  • 3.1 Introduction
  • 3.2 Geach and Attributive Goodness
  • 3.3 Foot and the Virtues
  • 3.4 Thomson and Goodness in a Way
  • 3.5 Zimmerman's Ethical Goodness
  • 3.6 A Better Reply: Absolute Value and Fitting Attitudes
  • 3.7 Summary
  • 4. Personal Value
  • 4.1 Introduction
  • 4.2 Moore on Good and Good For
  • 4.3 Good For and Fitting Attitudes
  • 4.4 Moore Strikes Back? -4.5 Agent-relative Value
  • 4.6 Impersonal/Personal and Agent-neutral/Agent-relative
  • 4.7 Summary
  • 5. The Chemistry of Value
  • 5.1 Introduction
  • 5.2 Supervenience and Other Relations
  • 5.3 Organic Unities
  • 5.4 Alternatives to Organic Unities: Virtual Value
  • 5.5 Alternatives to Organic Unities: Conditional Value
  • 5.6 Holism and Particularism
  • 5.7 Summary
  • 6. Value Relations
  • 6.1 Introduction
  • 6.2 The Trichotomy Thesis and Incomparability
  • 6.3 A Fitting Attitude Argument for Incomparability
  • 6.4 Against Incomparability: Epistemic Limitations
  • 6.5 Against Incomparability: Parity
  • 6.6 Parity and Choice
  • 6.7 Parity and Incomparability
  • 6.8 Summary
  • 7. How Do I Favour Thee?
  • 7.1 Introduction
  • 7.2 Three Dimensions of Favouring
  • 7.3 Responses to Value: Maximizing
  • 7.4 Two Concepts of Intrinsic Value?
  • 7.5 Summary
  • 8. Value and the Wrong Kind of Reasons
  • 8.1 Introduction
  • 8.2 The Fitting Attitude Account and its Rivals
  • 8.3 The Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem
  • 8.4 The Structure of the Problem and an Initial Response
  • 8.5 Reasons for What?
  • 8.6 Characteristic Concerns and Shared Reasons
  • 8.7 Circular Path: No-Priority
  • 8.8 Summary.